The Logic of Strategy and Bargaining with the Devil, Book Reviews
Strategy and Negotiations, two book reviews.
The Rise of China vs. the Logic of Strategy, by Edward N. Luttwak
Bargaining with the Devil, by Robert Mnookin
Without sounding trite, the Luttwak book is, well, logical. It’s based on the simple idea that over time logic will out over strategy. Specifically, that no matter what China does, there are consequences and reactions from other countries that will follow the logical positionalities of each. For example, as China grows its military, regardless of justification, regional neighbors and global competitors will read the growth of military strength through the lens of their own relative strength.
This logic should go without saying. But Luttwak makes a couple of points that are not so obvious—and are the value of the book. The first being that China does not now know how, and has historically really never known how to deal with other competitive states as equals. Luttwak claims that Chinese behaviors indicate that China doesn’t think that it has any peers. It’s on top, or should be, and acts accordingly. China’s historical ideology is that it doesn’t believe in equal relationships. It can’t be one of few great powers, it must be the global power. Working to accomplish that goal will ironically cause China to lose influence and prestige in the global system, especially with threatened regional neighbors. Money, deception, and threats are the main tools of China’s IR, and when money and (regional) military threats fail to deliver results, China is left with few friends and fewer options.
Second, historically China has sinocized its foreign invaders, yes, but it has also been regularly conquered by “lesser” barbarians a number of times. The willingness to think of Chinese culture as superior acts as blinders to the differences in non-Chinese cultures. Luttwak recognizes that these concepts are true for any country, not just China, but the book is specifically about how logic works regarding China.
These blinders affect how China negotiates and participates in international bodies and settings. For example, they exclusively want to deal with other countries on a one to one basis, rather than in groups or coalitions (e.g. SCS island disputes). Of course, this means that China is almost always the dominant partner in any negotiations—bigger size, larger economy, larger population, longer history, etc.—giving China leverage in almost all transactions.
Third, though it does have leaders in international organizations, China doesn’t lead out in any international organization. Chinese leaders in international organizations tend to pursue Chinese goals via the organization, rather than collective goals with Chinese leadership.
Of key importance is the (non-China specific) idea of Great State Autism. China is calcified in its own history and thinking. The assumption of logical and cultural superiority (Marxist linear theory and “5000 years of continuous Chinese history”) combined with the last 40 years of growth have essentially reinforced the idea that China was and will be again on top and likely no one can do anything about it (the right/wrong side of history). But the inability (unwillingness) to understand foreigners on their own terms will likely spoil the Chinese long game before hegemony is realized.
The most interesting takes in the book are what Luttwak says about traditional Chinese behaviors vs logical strategy. In a nutshell, Luttwak claims that Sunzi’s strategies, a la The Art of War, are not only on an intellectual level below logic but they are really just different types of deception dressed up in interesting sounding couplets. Luttwak explains that they are a level lower than logic because they are strategies that only work with people that are already familiar with Chinese cultures and histories. Regional countries that are either aware of the game or actively don’t play the game (Vietnam, Japan) have very adversarial relationships with China. And other countries that do not believe in Chinese historical/cultural hegemony (Western countries) simply call a spade a spade— i.e. China doesn’t keep its international agreements and is not a good partner. Ultimately, China relies too much on deception and garners mistrust in the global community despite its willingness to spend money.
The book spends time discussing the logic of strategy as a global and historical reality and positions China’s history of repeated foreign rulers as proof. Luttwak then details out the current (2012) position of various states in relation to China—India, Vietnam, South Korea, Japan, the US, and Australia. While dated, the reading of these relationships through the lens of Luttwak’s logic is an interesting exercise in seeing if his predictions in 2012 have come true or not. (Read it yourself to find out.)
I was recently listening to a podcast about Chinese soft power in Africa (Sinica Podcast with Maria Repnikova, March 16, 2022) in which the speaker mentioned that China expects that African nations and individuals, in exchange for trips/loans/education with no political ties or moral questions, are expected to reciprocate by showing deference to the Chinese in public relations and media. China provides money and the recipients not only repay the loan but are also expected to give China face for their generosity as well. In reality, many in Africa are indeed grateful for the ability to tap Chinese money without Western strings but at the same time resent working with Chinese and would rather have another option.
One of the things that I’ve regularly talked with people about as they enter the Chinese market is that as a foreigner in a Chinese space, you must learn and play your role. There isn’t an opportunity for foreign people/ideas to change China, rather China will likely change you. This is why barbarian invaders all eventually sinocized. But outside of China, China is the fish out of water, with little soft power to sustain relationships past the end of the last deal. Within China, foreigners either adapt or die. There are too many locals who both know their role and, more importantly, read/see/understand foreigners and and all that they do in the role that they believe the foreigners are playing—which has been taught to them for millennia. Both China’s distant and recent history has left most Chinese with little exposure to any others or other way of thinking other than Chinese, and they play their (China-defined) role in international spaces without knowing that they are the ones often acting out the incongruous part—similar to many westerners in China.
This helps to explain why all of China’s neighbors have fractious relationships with the Middle Kingdom. Tribute relationships are a historical legacy that even LDCs are loath to revive, even for no-strings-attached loans.
The second book, Bargaining with the Devil, by Mnookin, leaves me wanting more. More of both the information provided (is there a part two? A workbook?), and more negotiating details (as opposed to long stories). The book is premised on the idea that there are indeed times when you should and should not bargain with the Devil, whomever that may be in your life. The logic is sound and the stories are fitting. But the stories are more than half the book and could easily have been edited down and allowed for more analysis and situational application.
I read these two books together, not purposefully, but they seemed to compliment each other, each focusing on logic and morals that inform behaviors in complex contexts. Mnookin discusses ideas like the Fundamental Attribution Error, intuitive and analytical reasoning, CBA, personal morals, and avoiding emotional decision making. His one China-related comment, “suing in China would be hopeless,” is dated, as Dan Harris of China Law Blog fame (HarrisBricken.com) and others have noted; while Chinese courts are still focused on social harmony (keeping the CCP in power) over blind justice, they are fantastically better than they were even a decade ago. Today, going to court in China is a legitimate option and you should prepare all your legal documentation for your China corporation with Chinese courts (not, HK or US, or elsewhere) in mind.
Another question that I came away with unanswered is this: When do people working for a corrupt/evil/devilish system become themselves culpable? Mnookin shares two stories about demonizing and humanizing people working for “the system,” justifying each choice based on the individual situation. While this might be a logical position (“it depends”) for him to take, in my opinion it negates the responsibility for active choices made by those working on behalf of “the devil.” I can understand the need to not demonize a personal adversary in a heated argument. But by the same token, recognizing culpability changes the dynamic of negotiations. At what point are bureaucrats culpable for “just doing their job” in a corrupt system?
Likely the most helpful ideas centered around Spock. Mnookin use the Star Trek character to be the logical cold-blooded foil for emotionally charged situations. Asking questions about goals rather than emotions, and focusing strategy and behavior on things that can be controlled as opposed to directing emotions at others.
The three main sections of the book deal with “the devil” in different situations in global politics, business, and family. Good stories and example to be sure, but again, I’m looking for practical application—I think that most people already know they shouldn’t be emotional, should check with a third party, and/or should have an ultimate goal and bottom line set when beginning negotiations. But there isn’t any “how-to” in this book.
(For me, the better book on these issues is Crucial Conversations (Patterson, et al), which Mnookin actually mentions. The issues presented in the two books aren’t all that different, but the advice in Crucial Conversations is more practical and specifically geared to immediate implementation. And there are steps for application and practice in each chapter. Full disclosure, I used to work for VitalSmarts.)
I read Mnokin’s book with the idea that I would learn about how to be a better business negotiator. I wanted practicable skills. I came away instead with a deeper understanding of the moral issues surrounding the principles that precede negotiations but little practical application. Ideally there would either be many more shorter stories or a workbook to accompany this theoretical discussion.
Ultimately, the two books really do compliment each other in the idea that they prioritize principled behavior, no matter the situation. The morals that direct behaviors should be carefully considered for both effectiveness as well as contextual appropriateness. Logic dictates that strategy needs to be double checked for both flaws and emotional blind-spots.
I hope that Mnookin publishes a “how to” manual and I would like to see Luttwak update his book; maybe this is the Luttwak update, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mnu1G6k9GM4.
